One in Messiah Congregation

 

The mistrial of Yeshua

 

The Sanhedrin acted against todays Talmud

 

The Sanhedrin:

 

personally plotted against Yeshua

used Judas to help arrest Yeshua

held court in the wrong place

held court on a feast day and after sundown

sought false witnesses

listed only arguments against Yeshua

cross-examining of witnesses was not according to Talmud

had only one trail

etc...........

 

Some Talmud verses to show this injustice.

 

 

Talmud - Mas. Megilah 13b

15 Come, let us put poison in the dish so that he will die. They did not know that Mordecai was one of those who had seats in the Chamber of Hewn Stone,16 and that he understood seventy languages .17 Said the other to him, But are not my post and your post different?

 

(16) ,hzdv ,fak. The meeting place of the Sanhedrin in the Temple at Jerusalem.

 

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 32a

 

C H A P T E R I V

 

MISHNAH. BOTH CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES DEMAND INQUIRY AND EXAMINATION.1 AS IT IS WRITTEN: YE SHALL HAVE ONE MANNER OF LAW.2 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES? — CIVIL SUITS [ARE TRIED] BY THREE; CAPITAL CASES BY TWENTY-THREE3 CIVIL SUITS MAY BE OPENED EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE OPENED FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION.4 CIVIL SUITS MAY BE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE, EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; WHEREAS CAPITAL CHARGES ARE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT [AT LEAST] TWO FOR CONDEMNATION .5 IN MONETARY CASES THE DECISION MAY BE REVERSED6 BOTH FOR A ACQUITTAL AND FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION. IN MONETARY CASES, ALL7 MAY ARGUE FOR OR AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ANYONE MAY ARGUE IN HIS FAVOUR, BUT NOT AGAINST HIM. IN CIVIL SUITS, HE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION, MAY8 THEN ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, AND VICE VERSA; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ONE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION MAY SUBSEQUENTLY ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT VICE VERSA.9

 

CIVIL SUITS ARE TRIED BY DAY, AND CONCLUDED AT NIGHT.10 BUT CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE TRIED BY DAY AND CONCLUDED BY DAY. CIVIL SUITS CAN BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY, WHETHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MAY BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY WITH A FAVOURABLE VERDICT, BUT ONLY ON THE MORROW WITH AN UNFAVOURABLE VERDICT.11 THEREFORE TRIALS ARE NOT HELD ON THE EVE OF A SABBATH OR FESTIVAL .12 IN CIVIL SUITS.13 AND IN CASES OF CLEANNESS AND UNCLEANNESS, WE BEGIN WITH [THE OPINION OF] THE MOST EMINENT [OF THE JUDGES]; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, WE COMMENCE WITH [THE OPINION OF] THOSE ON THE SIDE [BENCHES].

 

ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CIVIL SUITS, BUT NOT ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CAPITAL CHARGES, ONLY PRIESTS, LEVITES, AND ISRAELITES [LAYMEN] WITH WHOM PRIESTS CAN ENTER INTO MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP.14

 

GEMARA. Do civil suits really need inquiry and examination? The following opposes it: If a bond is dated the first of Nisan in the Shemittah,15 and witnesses came and said: ‘How can ye testify to this bond: were ye not with us on that day in such and such a place?’ the bond is valid, and its signatories remain competent [witnesses], for we presume that they might merely have postponed writing it.16 Now if you should think that inquiry and examination are necessary, how ‘presume that they might merely have postponed writing it?17 — But on your reasoning, one should object rather to the [following] Mishnah:18 Ante-dated bonds19 of indebtedness are invalid;20 if post-dated, they are valid.21 Now, if you should think that examination and inquiry are necessary, why are post-dated notes valid?22 — This23 is no difficulty, for a more powerful objection is raised,24 viz., that even in the case of a bond dated the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year, when people, as a rule, do not transact loans, and when, consequently, we cannot [plausibly] say that the writing [of the bond] might have been postponed, since no one would intentionally weaken the validity of his document:25 yet since the annulment of debts is effectuated only at the expiration of the Sabbatical year,we declare the bond valid.26 At all events, however, the difficulty27 remains.

 

(Mnemonic: Harpash.28 )

 

R. Hanina said: By Biblical law, both monetary and capital cases require inquiry and investigation, as it is written: One manner of judgment ye shall have. 29 Why then were civil suits exempted from this procedure? In order not to lock the door against borrowers.30 But if so,

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(1) Heb. vrhevu vahrs, i.e, examination of witnesses on the main points, e.g., amount (loaned), date and place.

(2) Lev. XXIV, 22. I.e., both capital and monetary cases shall be alike. With regard to capital cases it is written; Then shalt thou inquire and make search (Deut. XIII, 15).

(3) V. supra 2a; 23a.

(4) The reference is to the judicial debate on the matter. In civil suits, the points in favour of condemnation may be put first; but in capital charges, the arguments for acquittal must be first marshalled, but v. Krauss, a.l. for another interpretation. But of course, it cannot refer to the actual opening of the case; the indictment and case for the prosecution must obviously be stated before there is a charge to answer.

(5) V. supra 2a and infra 36b.

(6) On errors being revealed.

(7) Even the pupils, those seated behind the judges for the purpose of filling up vacancies. Cf. infra 37a.

(8) On finding his arguments erroneous.

(9) According to Rashi, this is deduced from Num. XXXV, 25, The Congregation shall deliver the manslayer, meaning that all the endeavours of the court should be directed towards deliverance. According to Maim., Yad, Sanh., X, 2, it is deduced from Ex. XXIII, 2, Neither shalt thou speak in a quarrel to incline etc. Probably he based his deduction on the Mekilta comment on the verse, where reference is made to the judges’ duty to lean towards acquittal.

(10) Where the deliberations have been protracted.

(11) In case points in the accused's favour are discovered during the night.

(12) Since should he be found guilty, the case cannot be concluded on the morrow, execution being forbidden on Sabbaths and Festivals. (From this it is seen that by ‘concluding’ the actual carrying out of the sentence is meant, not merely the promulgation of the verdict.) Moreover, it is against the law — except in the case of a rebellious Elder, v. infra 89a — to leave judgement in suspense. V. Maim., Yad, Sanh. XII, 4.

(13) CIVIL SUITS is omitted in most Mishnaic versions.

(14) I.e., of pure descent.

(15) vyhna; Sabbatical year. Though the regulations of the Sabbatical year include also the annulment of all monetary obligations, ‘when the creditor is legally debarred from collecting his debt (v. Deut. XV, 2), yet in various exceptional cases the law of Shemittah did not operate, e.g., if a Prosbul (kuczurp) had been written. This was a legal instrument executed and attested in Court whereby the lender retained the right to collect the debt at any time he thought fit (cf. Sheb. X, 4). Further shemittah does not affect a loan advanced on a pledge, or where the claim for collection had been made before the expiration of the Sabbatical year, in which cases loans are not annulled. V. ‘Ar. 28b.

(16) I.e., they might have witnessed the loan on an earlier date, but have postponed writing the bond until the first day of Nisan (Rashi). [According to Yad Ramah, render, ‘they might have post-dated it.’ We do not assume that it has been ante-dated (v. infra) as there is a presumption in favour of all duly attested documents, v. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 748, n. 16.]

(17) If such an assumption is permissible, examination as to date and placed is purposeless.

(18) Rather than the Baraitha, since scholars are more conversant with the Mishnah than with Baraithoth.

(19) I.e., bearing on the evidence of witnesses, of an earlier date than the actual loan.

(20) As a rule the debtor's property is given as security for the loan, and in the case of default, the creditor may seize it if sold after the loan was incurred, but not before. Hence, if the note was ante-dated, sold property might be seized unlawfully. In order to prevent this, an ante-dated bond was declared altogether invalid, even from the date of transaction. Cf. B.M. 72a.

(21) It appears that the creditor must have renounced his security for the period between the date of the loan and that appearing on the note.

(22) Seeing that they might be mere forgeries? Hence, even if the loan itself is attested as having taken place, it should rank as only a verbal loan, which cannot be collected from property sold even after it was incurred.

(23) I.e., the fact that the objection is raised on the ground of a Baraitha rather than of a Mishnah.

(24) In the Baraitha quoted.

(25) By dating it some time in the Sabbatical year, when the debt is threatened with annulment, and so inevitably arousing the suspicion of forgery.

(26) By assuming its writing has been postponed to the Sabbatical year. Thus, this assumption, since it is possible, is made in spite of its improbability, a loan in the Sabbatical year still being rare. How much more so is the assumption to be made in normal cases. Why then should the witnesses be examined on the date, since even if it is disproved, their testimony holds good?

(27) I.e., the fact that the Baraitha is contradictory to our Mishnah; v. preceding note.

(28) V. p. 21, n. 5. Here it stands for R. Hanina, Raba, R. Papa, and R. ASHi. the four Rabbis whose views are given here.

(29) Lev. XXIV, 22.

(30) V. supra 2b. The view expressed in our Mishnah was taught before this enactment; and the Baraitha and Mishnah in Sheb., after this enactment.

 

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 88b

 

[ii] if the father and mother wished to pardon a ‘stubborn and rebellious son’,1 they may do so, and [iii] the [local] Beth din may pardon a rebellious elder, if they desire it. But when I went to my colleagues of the South,2 they agreed to the [first] two but not to the rebellious elder, that contention might not increase in Israel.3 This is all [unanswerable] refutation.

 

It has been taught; R. Jose said; Originally there were not many disputes in Israel, but one Beth din of seventy-one members sat in the Hall of Hewn Stones, and two courts of twenty-three sat, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount and one at the door of the [Temple] Court, and other courts of twenty-three sat in all Jewish cities. If a matter of inquiry arose, the local Beth din was consulted. If they had a tradition [thereon] they stated it; if not, they went to the nearest Beth din. If they had a tradition thereon, they stated it, if not, they went to the Beth din situated at the entrance to the Temple Mount; if they had a tradition, they stated it; if not, they went to the one situated at the entrance of the Court, and he [who differed from his colleagues] declared, ‘Thus have I expounded, and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have they taught.’ If they had a tradition thereon, they stated it, and if not, they all proceeded to the Hall of Hewn Stones, where they [i.e., the Great Sanhedrin] sat from the morning tamid4 until the evening talmid; on Sabbaths and festivals they sat within the hel.5 The question was then put before them: if they had a tradition thereon, they stated it; if not, they took a vote: if the majority voted ‘unclean’ they declared it so; if ‘clean’ they ruled even so. But when the disciples of Shammai and Hillel, who [sc. the disciples] had insufficiently studied, increased [in number], disputes multiplied in Israel, and the Torah became as two Toroth.6 From there [the Hall of Hewn Stones] documents were written and sent to all Israel, appointing men of wisdom and humility7 and who were esteemed by their fellowmen as local judges. From there [sc. the local Beth din] they were promoted to [the Beth din of] the Temple Mount,8 thence to the Court, and thence to the Hall of Hewn Stones.

 

They sent word from there,9 Who is destined for the world to come? He who is meek, humble, stooping on entering and on going out, and a constant student of the Torah without claiming merit therefor. [Thereupon] the Rabbis cast their eyes upon R. ‘Ulla b. Abba [as endowed with all these qualities].

 

IF HE RETURNED TO HIS TOWN AND TAUGHT AGAIN etc. Our Rabbis taught: He is not liable unless he [himself] acts upon his ruling, or states his ruling to others, who act thereon. Now, as for stating his ruling to others, who act upon it, it is well: before [receiving the decision of the Great Beth din] he was not liable to death, [since he personally committed no wrong] whilst now he is [for flouting its authority]. But [as for the proviso that] he himself must act upon his ruling — even before [the decision was rendered in the Hall of Hewn Stones] he was liable to death! Now, there is no difficulty if his ruling referred to forbidden fat and blood, since before he was not liable to whilst now he is. But if he ruled on a matter involving the death penalty at the hands of Beth din, he would have been liable to death even before! — Before, he needed a formal warning;10 now he does not.11 But what of a mesith, for whom no warning is required?12 — Before, had he stated a reason [excusing or justifying his action], it might have been accepted; but now, even if he stated a reason, it would not be accepted.

 

MISHNAH. THERE IS GREATER STRINGENCY IN RESPECT TO THE TEACHINGS OF THE SCRIBES THAN IN RESPECT TO THE TORAH. [THUS,] IF ONE [A REBELLIOUS ELDER] SAYS, THERE IS NO PRECEPT OF TEFILLIN, SO THAT A BIBLICAL LAW MAY BE TRANSGRESSED, HE IS EXEMPT.13 [BUT IF HE RULES THAT THE TEFILLIN MUST CONTAIN] FIVE COMPARTMENTS, THUS ADDING TO THE WORDS OF THE SCRIBES,14 HE IS LIABle.

 

GEMARA. R. Eleazar said in R. Oshaia's name: He is liable only for a matter of which the fundamental law is Biblical, whilst its interpretation is of the Scribes, and in which there is room for addition, which addition, however, is the equivalent of subtraction. Now, the only precept [fulfilling these conditions] is that of tefillin.15 Now, this statement was made according to R. Judah.16 But is there not the lulab,17 the fundamental law of which is Biblical.18 the interpretation Rabbinical,19 there being room for addition,20 which addition amounts to subtraction?21 — Now, what is our opinion? If we hold that the lulab need not be bound [with the other two species],22 each stands apart.23 Whilst if we maintain that the lulab needs binding, it is defective from the very outset.24 But is there not the law of fringes, the basic precept of which is Biblical,25 the interpretation Rabbinical, there is room for addition,26 whilst such addition amounts to subtraction?27 — What is our opinion? If we maintain that the upper knot is not required by Biblical law, they are separate from each other;28 whilst if we hold

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(1) Even after all the necessary warnings had been given.

(2) [I.e., R. Meir, R. Judah and R. Jose among others, v. Halevy, op. cit., II, p. 180].

(3) Since this is the reason, it proves that he is executed even if he based his ruling on tradition and they on reason.

(4) The daily continual burnt offering.

(5) A place within the fortification of the Temple (Jast.). They changed their locale, lest they should appear to be giving judgments, which is forbidden on these days.

(6) Pl. of Torah. There being many conflicting rulings.

(7) Lit., ‘of lowly knee.’

(8) When a vacancy occurred through death.

(9) Palestine. This expression always refers to R. Eleazar b. Pedath (supra 17b). (7) An offence in connection with these does not involve capital punishment.

(10) Cf. supra pp. 494-5.

(11) Since he is punished not for actually committing the offence, but for flouting Beth din.

(12) If he acted as an inciter to idolatry, but maintained that his words did not purport thus, and the Great Beth din ruled that they did, it is shewn that he was liable to death even before and without a warning, which is unnecessary for a mesith.

(13) Since all know that the Bible commands the wearing of tefillin, the words of the elder will be ineffective.

(14) Who required only four in the head-tefillin.

(15) The fundamental law of wearing tefillin is Biblical. By Rabbinic interpretation, the head-tefillin must contain four compartments, with inscriptions in each. Hence it is possible to rule that it should consist of a greater number. But if this is done, the tefillin is unfit, so that the addition amounts to subtraction of its fitness.

(16) V. supra 87a. where R. Meir, R. Judah, and R. Simeon are in dispute.

(17) The palm branch, which was to be taken with other species of plant life on the Festival of Tabernacles.

(18) Lev. XXIII, 40.

(19) I.e., that it must be taken together with three other species, viz., the citron, myrtle, and willow.

(20) I.e., more than three species can be added.

(21) For if there are more than three species in all, the combination is invalid for the fulfilment of the precept.

(22) The citron, though taken together with the other species, is not bound with them.

(23) So that the combination is quite valid.

(24) I.e., as soon as more than the three species are bound together, the combination is invalid. But in the case of phylacteries, when four compartments are made, the head-tefillin is valid; when a fifth is added, it becomes invalid.

(25) Num. XV, 38f.

(26) By placing more than the requisite number of threads.

(27) Since the fringes become invalid thereby.

(28) The fringes are inserted through a hole and knotted near the edge of the garment. It is disputed whether this is really necessary by Biblical law. If not, then even when made the fringes are regarded as hanging apart and distinct. Consequently, if five instead of four were inserted and knotted, four fulfil the precept, whilst the fifth may be disregarded entirely, without rendering the rest invalid.

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 3a

Lev.24[ 22] Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the LORD your God.

 

One manner of judgment shall you have. 1 Why then did they [the Sages] declare that monetary cases are not subject to this exacting procedure? In order not to ‘bolt the door’ against borrowers.2 But if non-Mumhin are competent to adjudicate in monetary cases, ought they not to be protected against any claim of compensation in case of their having given an erroneous decision? — All the more then would you be ‘bolting the door’ against borrowers.

 

If it be so, [that cases of indebtedness require three, why does R. Abbahu say that the Tanna adds an explanatory clause, and not simply that] the Mishnah teaches two separate laws; viz. MONETARY cases are tried by three laymen3 whilst cases of LARCENY AND MAYHEM are tried by three Mumhin3 . Moreover, if the two clauses merely explain each other, why mention ‘three’ in each? — indeed, said Raba,4 the Tanna teaches two separate laws; and cases of indebtedness need no Mumhin for the reason given above by R. Hanina.

 

R. Aha the son of R. Ika says: According to Scriptural law, even a single person is competent to try cases of indebtedness as it is said: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor.5 Three, however, are needed in case traffickers6 presume to act as judges. But even with the provision of three might they not all be traffickers? — It is, however unlikely that none of them should have any knowledge of the law. If this be so, they should be exempt from liability in case they erred? — But how much more would traffickers presume in such circumstances to act as judges!7 Wherein then lies the difference between Raba and R. Aha the son of R. Ika [since both agree that mere laymen are competent]? Their difference centres round the opinion of Samuel who said: ‘if two [laymen] have tried a monetary case, their decision holds good. but they are called a presumptuous Beth din.’ Whereas Raba8 does not agree with Samuel, R. Aha does agree with him.

 

CLAIMS FOR FULL OR HALF DAMAGES etc.

 

Do not FULL DAMAGES come under the category of MAYHEM9 [why then this specification]? — Since the Tanna had to state HALF DAMAGES he mentions, also FULL DAMAGES. But is not HALF DAMAGES also included in the same category? — The Tanna speaks of two classes of payment — kenas10 [fine] and indemnity . This opinion would be in accord with the Amora who considers HALF DAMAGES kenas, but how meet the difficulty according to the one who regards it as indemnity?11 — Since the Tanna had to state DOUBLE AND FOUR- OR FIVE-FOLD RESTITUTION, which is an indemnity

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(1) Lev. XXIV, 22.

(2) Creditors would refuse to advance loans should difficulties confront them in collecting their debts; and the same consideration has led to the suspension of the law regarding the need of Mumhin.

(3) *******, an ordinary person.

(4) Differing from R. Abbahu.

(5) Lev. XIX, 15.

(6) Unversed in the law. [Heb. ,ubre hcauh , lit., rendered sit (a) at street corners, (b) in waggons, (c) in markets, (d) a company (of musicians), connecting the word with the Latin corona, (e) a corruption of the abbreviations ,"ure ,uhyr,u ,uhxere ‘circuses and theatres’, a reading supported by the J.T.]

(7) Since they would be protected against all claims of compensation.

(8) Since according to him three are biblically required.

(9) The term Nezek (damage), being the terminus technicus for all kinds of damages including those rising out of mayhem.

(10) I.e. a fine imposed upon the owner for not guarding his animal from causing damage, as distinct from damages in cases of mayhem, which are considered indemnity.

(11) V. B.K. 15a.

 

 

John.7 [24] Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgment.

Deut.1[ 16] And I charged your judges at that time, saying, Hear the causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him.

Prov.31[ 9] Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and needy.

 

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 7a

that it is a meritorious act to ask the litigants whether they wish to resort to law or to a settlement. If so, this agrees with the opinion of the first Tanna?1 There is this difference, however: R. Joshua b. Korha regards this as a moral obligation; the first Tanna merely as a permissible act. But this would make the first Tanna express the same opinion as R. Simeon b. Manasya? — The difference centres round the latter part of R. Simeon's statement: ‘If you have already heard the case and know in whose favour the verdict inclines, you are not at liberty to suggest a settlement’, [a distinction which the first Tanna does not admit].

A difference of opinion is expressed by R. Tanhum b. Hanilai, who says that the verse quoted2 refers only to the story of the golden calf, as it is written: And when Aaron saw it, he built an altar before it.3 What did he actually see? — R. Benjamin b. Japhet says, reporting R. Eleazar: He saw Hur lying slain before him and said [to himself]: If I do not obey them, they will now do unto me as they did unto Hur, and so will be fulfilled [the fear of] the prophet, Shall the Priest and the Prophet be slain in the Sanctuary of God?4 and they will never find forgiveness. Better let them worship the golden calf, for which offence they may yet find forgiveness through repentance.5

And how do those other Tannaim, who allow a settlement even when a case has been heard, interpret the verse: The beginning of strife is as one that letteth out water?6 They interpret it as does R. Hamnuna. For R. Hamnuna says: The first matter for which a man is called to give account in the Hereafter is regarding the study of the Torah, as it is said: The beginning of judgment7 concerns the letting out of water.8

R. Huna says [with reference to this verse]: Strife is compared to an opening made by a rush of water that widens as the water presses through it.

Abaye the Elder9 says: Strife is like the planks of a wooden bridge; the longer they lie, the firmer they grow.

(‘Mnemonic: Hear, And Two, Seven, Songs, Another.)10

There was a man who used to say: Happy is he who hears abuse of himself and ignores it; for a hundred evils pass him by. Samuel said to Rab Judah: This is alluded to in the verse: He who letteth out water [of strife] causeth the beginning of madon11 [the numerical value of which is a hundred].12 that is, the beginning of a hundred strifes.

Again, there was a man who used to say: Do not be surprised if a thief goes unhanged for two or three thefts; he will be caught in the end. Samuel said to Rab Judah: This is alluded to in the verse: Thus saith the Lord: for three transgressions of Judah, but for four I will not reverse it13 [i.e. My judgment].

Another used to say: Seven pits lie open for the good man [but he escapes]; for the evil-doer there is only one, into which he falls. This, said Samuel to Rab Judah, is alluded to in the verse: The righteous man falleth seven times and riseth up again.14

Yet another used to say: Let him who comes from a court that has taken from him his cloak sing his song and go his way.15 Said Samuel to Rab Judah: This is alluded to in the verse, And all this people also [i.e. including the losers] shall come to their place in peace.16

There was yet another who used to say: When a woman slumbers the [working] basket drops off her head.17 Said Samuel to Rab Judah: This is alluded to in the verse, By slothfulness the rafters sink in.18

Another man used to say: The man on whom I relied shook his fist at me.19 Samuel said to Rab Judah: This is alluded to in the verse: Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted and who did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.20

Another used to say: When love21 was strong, we could have made our bed on a sword-blade; now that our love has grown weak, a bed of sixty [cubits] is not large enough for us. Said R. Huna: This is alluded to in the verses: Of the former age [when Israel was loyal to God] it is said: And I will meet with thee and speak with three from above the ark-cover;22 and further it is taught: The Ark measured nine hand-breadths high and the cover one hand-breadth, i.e. ten in all. Again it is written: As for the House which King Solomon built for the Lord, the length thereof was three score cubits, the breadth thereof twenty cubits, and the height thereof thirty cubits.23 But of the latter age [when they had forsaken God] it is written: Thus saith the Lord, The Heaven is my throne and the earth my footstool. Where is the house that ye may build unto me?24

What evidence is there that the verb taguru [translated ‘be afraid’] can also be rendered ‘gather in’?25 R. Nahman answered by quoting the verse: Thou shalt neither drink of the wine nor gather [te'egor] the grapes.26 R. Aha b. Jacob says that it can be proved from the following verse: Provideth her bread in the summer and gathereth [agerah] her food in the harvest.27 R. Aha the son of R. Ika says it can be derived from the following verse: A wise son gathereth [oger] in summer.28

(Mnemonic: Truth, Money, Shall See.)

R. Nahman said, reporting R. Jonathan : A judge who delivers a judgment in perfect truth29 causes the Shechinah to dwell in Israel, for it is written: God standeth in the Congregation of God; in the midst of the judges He judgeth.

30 And he who does not deliver judgments in perfect truth causes the Shechinah to depart from the midst of Israel, for it is written: Because of the oppression of the poor, because of the sighing of the needy, now will I arise, saith the Lord.

Again. R. Samuel b. Nahmani, reporting R. Jonathan. said: A judge who unjustly takes the possessions31 of one and gives then to another, the Holy One, blessed be He, takes from him his life, for it is written: Rob not the poor because he is poor; neither oppress the afflicted in the gate’, for the Lord will plead their cause, and will despoil of life those that despoil them.32

R. Samuel b. Nahmani further said, reporting R. Jonathan: A judge should always think of33 himself as if he had a sword hanging over his head34 and Gehenna35 gaping under him,

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(1) Who holds that arbitration may be suggested before the verdict is given.

(2) Ps. X, 3.

(3) Ex. XXXII, 5.

(4) Lam. II, 20.

(5) He thus made a compromise, and this compromise is denounced by the Psalmist.

(6) Prov. XVII, 14.

(7) iusn ‘Strife’ or ‘judgment’.

(8) I.e. the Torah, which is compared by the Rabbis to water. V. Ex. Rab. II, 9.

(9) Abaye Kashisha, as distinct from the more famous Abaye. In fact, the latter quotes him in Keth. 94a.

(10) Or, ‘Hear, Vashti, Seven, Songs, Another’; Vashti and ‘And Two’ being spelled alike in Hebrew, h,au V. p. 21, n. 5.

(11) Prov. XVII, 14.

(12) iusn = 40,4,6,50 respectively — 100 in all.

(13) Amos II, 6. Taken as an elliptical verse, with the meaning: ‘Though I may reverse or keep back My judgment for the first three offences, punishment shall not be withheld for the fourth.’

(14) Prov. XXIV, 16.

(15) He should be happy that he was relieved of an ill-gotten thing.

(16) Ex. XVIII, 23.

(17) Carelessness is the immediate cause of ruin.

(18) I.e. the house falleth to decay. Ecc. X, 18.

(19) Or, ‘raised his club against me.’

(20) Ps. XLI, 10.

(21) Between my wife and myself.

(22) Ex. XXV, 22.

(23) I Kings VI, 2.

(24) Isa. LXVI, 1. Thus at first the Shechinah rested on an Ark of small dimensions, but when Israel sinned, even Solomon's Temple was too small.

(25) Referring back to p. 24.

(26) Deut. XXVIII, 39. rdt,.

(27) Prov VI, 8. vrdt

(28) Ibid. X, 5. rdut

(29) Lit. ‘true to its own truth’, i.e. an absolutely true verdict which can be arrived at by the judge if he endeavours to find out the truth himself and does not rely on the evidence alone. V. Tosaf B.B. 8b; Meg. 15b.

(30) Ps.LXXXII, 1. (10) Ibid. XII, 6.

(31) Lit., ‘money’.

(32) Prov. XXII, 22-23.

(33) Lit.,’see’.

(34) Lit. ‘resting between his flanks’.

(35) V. Glos.

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 40a

MISHNAH. THEY [THE JUDGES] USED TO EXAMINE THEM1 WITH SEVEN [HAKIROTH] SEARCHING QUERIES:

IN WHAT SEPTENNATE?

2 IN WHAT YEAR?

IN WHAT MONTH?

ON WHICH DAY OF THE MONTH?

ON WHAT DAY?

3 AT WHAT HOUR [OF THE DAY]?

AND, AT WHAT PLACE?

R. JOSE SAID: [THEY WERE ONLY ASKED:] ON WHICH DAY [OF THE WEEK]? AT WHAT HOUR? AND, AT WHAT PLACE? [THEY WERE FURTHER ASKED:] DID YE KNOW HIM?4 AND, DID YE WARN HIM?5

WHERE ONE COMMITS IDOLATRY, [THE WITNESSES ARE ALSO ASKED] WHAT6 DID HE WORSHIP? AND, HOW7 DID HE WORSHIP? THE MORE EXHAUSTIVE THE CROSS-EXAMINATION [BEDIKOTH] THE MORE PRAISEWORTHY THE JUDGE. IT ONCE HAPPENED THAT BEN ZAKKAI8 CROSS-EXAMINED [THE WITNESSES] EVEN AS TO THE STALKS OF THE FIGS.9

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HAKIROTH AND BEDIKOTH?10 — IN HAKIROTH, IF ONE [OF THE WITNESSES] ANSWERS: ‘I DO NOT KNOW,’ THEIR11 EVIDENCE IS VOID. WITH RESPECT TO BEDIKOTH, HOWEVER, IF ONE ANSWERS: I DO NOT KNOW,’ OR EVEN IF BOTH SAY: ‘WE DO NOT KNOW, THEIR EVIDENCE IS VALID. BUT IF THEY [THE WITNESSES] CONTRADICT EACH OTHER, WHETHER IN THE HAKIROTH OR THE BEDIKOTH, THEIR EVIDENCE IS VALID.

IF ONE [WITNESS] TESTIFIES, ‘[IT HAPPENED] ON THE SECOND OF THE MONTH,’ AND THE OTHER, ‘ON THE THIRD OF THE MONTH:’ THEIR EVIDENCE IS VALID, FOR ONE MAY HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE INTERCALATION OF THE MONTH AND THE OTHER MAY NOT HAVE BEEN AWARE OF IT.12 IF, HOWEVER, ONE SAYS, ‘ON THE THIRD,’ AND THE OTHER, ‘ON THE FIFTH, THEIR EVIDENCE IS INVALID. SIMILARLY, IF ONE TESTIFIES, ‘DURING THE SECOND HOUR [OF THE DAY]’13 AND THE OTHER ‘DURING THE THIRD HOUR:’ THEIR EVIDENCE IS VALID.14 BUT IF ONE SAYS, AT THREE,’ AND ANOTHER, ‘AT FIVE,’ THEIR EVIDENCE IS INVALID.15 R. JUDAH SAID: [EVEN THEN, THEIR EVIDENCE IS] VALID. BUT IF ONE SAYS, ‘AT FIVE,’ AND THE OTHER, ‘AT SEVEN,’ THEIR EVIDENCE IS INVALID, FOR AT FIVE THE SUN IS TO THE EAST, WHILE AT SEVEN, THE SUN IS TO THE WEST.

AFTER THIS, THE SECOND [WITNESS] IS ADMITTED16 AND [LIKEWISE] EXAMINED. IF THEIR EVIDENCE TALLIES, THEY [THE JUDGES] COMMENCE [THE PROCEEDINGS] IN FAVOUR [OF THE ACCUSED].17

SHOULD ONE OF THE WITNESSES DECLARE, ‘I HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY IN HIS FAVOUR’; OR ONE OF THE DISCIPLES, ‘I HAVE AN ARGUMENT IN HIS DISFAVOUR’, HE IS SILENCED.18 BUT IF A DISCIPLE SAYS, ‘I HAVE SOMETHING TO PLEAD IN HIS FAVOUR’, HE IS BROUGHT UP AND SEATED WITH THEM,19 AND DOES NOT DESCEND FROM THERE ALL THAT DAY. IF THERE IS SUBSTANCE IN HIS STATEMENT HE IS HEARD. AND EVEN IF HE [THE ACCUSED] HIMSELF SAYS,’ I AM IN A POSITION TO PLEAD IN MY OWN DEFENCE, HE IS HEARD, PROVIDED THERE IS SUBSTANCE IN HIS STATEMENT.

IF THEY FIND HIM NOT GUILTY, HE IS DISCHARGED, IF NOT, IT [THE TRIAL] IS ADJOURNED TILL THE FOLLOWING DAY,20 WHILST THEY [THE JUDGES] GO ABOUT IN PAIRS,21 PRACTISE MODERATION IN FOOD, DRINK NO WINE THE WHOLE DAY,22 AND DISCUSS23 THE CASE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. EARLY NEXT MORNING THEY REASSEMBLE IN COURT. HE WHO IS IN FAVOUR OF ACQUITTAL STATES, ‘I DECLARED HIM INNOCENT AND STAND BY MY OPINION.’ WHILE HE WHO IS IN FAVOUR OF CONDEMNATION SHALL SAY: ‘I DECLARE HIM GUILTY AND STAND BY MY OPINION.’ ONE WHO [PREVIOUSLY] ARGUED FOR CONVICTION MAY NOW ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT VICE VERSA. IF THEY HAVE MADE ANY MISTAKE, THE TWO JUDGES’ CLERKS24 ARE TO REMIND THEM THEREOF.

IF THEY FIND HIM NOT GUILTY, THEY DISCHARGE HIM. IF NOT, THEY TAKE A VOTE.25 IF TWELVE ACQUIT AND ELEVEN CONDEMN, HE IS ACQUITTED. IF TWELVE CONDEMN AND ELEVEN ACQUIT, OR IF ELEVEN CONDEMN AND ELEVEN ACQUIT AND ONE SAYS, ‘I DO NOT KNOW,’26 OR EVEN IF TWENTY-TWO ACQUIT OR CONDEMN AND A SINGLE ONE SAYS, ‘I DO NOT KNOW,’27 THEY ADD TO THE JUDGES. UP TO WHAT NUMBER IS THE COURT INCREASED? — BY TWOS UP TO THE LIMIT OF SEVENTY-ONE.28

IF THIRTY-SIX ACQUIT AND THIRTY-FIVE CONDEMN,29 HE IS ACQUITTED. BUT IF THIRTY-SIX CONDEMN AND THIRTY-FIVE ACQUIT, THE TWO SIDES DEBATE THE CASE TOGETHER UNTIL ONE OF THOSE WHO CONDEMN AGREES WITH THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO ARE FOR ACQUITTAL.

GEMARA. ‘Whence is this30 inferred? — Rab Judah said: Scripture states, Then shalt thou inquire and make search and ask diligently;31 and it says, And [if] it be told thee and thou hear it, then shalt thou inquire diligently;32 again it says, And the judges shall inquire diligently.33

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(1) The witnesses, in a capital charge, after admonition. Other versions read ‘him’, i.e., the witness, since the witnesses were separately examined.

(2) Of the Jubilee, was the murder committed?

(3) Of the week. This latter inquiry is necessary because witnesses who might come to refute their evidence, might not remember the date while knowing on what day of the week it took place. (Rashi).

(4) Rashi, the murderer; Maim. and others: the accused: R. Hananel: the murderer and the accused.

(5) That murder is forbidden on pain of death? These two questions, according to Maimonides (Yad ‘Eduth, I, 4-5) belong to the specific category of ,uahrs (inquiry) which is on the one hand treated like ,uehsc (investigation) in that the evidence is invalid if one of the witnesses cannot answer them; and on the other like ,uehsc, (cross-examination) in this respect that the witnesses are not amenable to the law of retaliation in case of refutation.

(6) I.e , which idol?

(7) Lit., ‘with what?’

(8) Cf. infra 41a.

(9) Of the tree under which a murder was alleged to have been committed.

(10) HAKIROTH refers to the questions on date, hour and place: BEDIKOTH to cross examination on the accompanying circumstances.

(11) I.e., that of both witnesses.

(12) I.e., one knew that the previous month had consisted of thirty days whilst the other thought that it had consisted only of twenty-nine days provided they agree as to the day of the week. Cf. Kesef Mishneh, on Yad'Eduth II, 4, and Tosaf. 41b s.v. sjt.

(13) The length of the day was counted from sunrise to sunset, and having regard to the variation of that period, an hour lasted anywhere between 49 and 71 minutes.

(14) For people are liable to error in matters of the exact time in the hour.

(15) An error in two hours is improbable.

(16) Mishnah supra pp. 175-6.

(17) V. supra 32b.

(18) Cf. supra 34a. Witnesses after having given their testimony, are not allowed to make any further statements, even for acquittal, as they might do so with a view to avoiding any possible charge of collusion arising out of their first evidence.

(19) The judges. It follows that the judges sat on raised seats faced by the disciples. V. supra p. 230, n. 10.

(20) Cf. supra 32a, and note.

(21) During the adjournment, to discuss the matter.

(22) Another precautionary measure in capital cases

(23) [V. Yad Ramah.]

(24) Cf. supra 36b.

(25) Lit., ‘they stand to vote.’

(26) So that there is no majority of two for conviction. cf. supra 2a.

(27) The member who is doubtful is regarded as non-existent (cf. supra 17a), whilst capital cases may not be tried by less than twenty-three.

(28) If there is a division of opinion amongst the newly co-opted members.

(29) When the court has been increased to the extreme limit.

(30) The seven questions of time and place.

(31) Deut. XIII, 15. In reference to a condemned city. The three expressions for investigation indicate three questions. It should be observed, however, that the Talmud does not regard the word ‘ask’ by itself as teaching that a formal question must be put to the witnesses but that here it is coupled with ‘diligently’.

(32) Ibid. XVII, 4, in connection with the trial of an idolater. The words thou shalt inquire denote one question, and the emphasis, diligently, a second.

(33) Ibid. XIX, 18, with reference to witnesses proved Zomemim (v. Glos). Here also two questions are implied. Hence seven questions in all are necessary.

 

Talmud - Mas. Shabbath 5a

 

Rabbi imposed liability only in the case of a covered-in private domain, for we say that a house is as though it were full,1 but not in one which is uncovered. And should you answer, Here too [in our Mishnah it speaks of] it as covered, [I might retort] that is well of a covered private ground, but is one liable for a covered public ground? Did not R. Samuel b. Judah say in the name of R. Abba in the name of R. Huna in Rab's name: If one carries an article four cubits in covered public ground, he is not liable, because it is not like the banners of the wilderness?2 — Rather, said R. Zera, the authority of this is the ‘others.’3 For it was taught: Others say: If he stands still in his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is liable; if he moves from his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is exempt.4 [Now it states], ‘If he stands in his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is liable’, — but surely there must be depositing on an area four [handbreadths square], which is absent! Hence this proves that we [i.e., ‘others’] do not require a place four by four. Yet perhaps only depositing [on such an area] is not required, but removal [from such] may be necessary? And even in respect to depositing too: perhaps it means that he spread out his garment and caught it, so that there is also depositing [on such an area]? — Said R. Zera: Our Mishnah also means that he removes it [the article] from a basket and places it in a basket, so that there is depositing too [in a place four square]. But HIS HAND is stated? — Learn: a basket in HIS HAND. Now, that is well of a basket in a private domain; but a basket in public ground ranks as a private domain?5 Must we then say that it does not agree with R. Jose son of R. Judah? For it was taught: R. Jose son of R. Judah said: If one fixes a rod in the street, at the top of which is a basket, [and] throws [an article] and it comes to rest upon it, he is liable.6 , For if it agrees with R. Jose son of R. Judah, WHERE THE MASTER OF THE HOUSE STRETCHES HIS HAND WITHOUT AND PLACES [AN OBJECT] IN THE POOR MAN'S HAND, why is he LIABLE? Surely he [merely] carries it from private ground to private ground! — You may even say [that it agrees with] R. Jose son of R. Judah: There it is above ten [handbreadths];7 here it is below ten.8 This9 presented a difficulty to R. Abbahu: Is then ‘a basket in his hand’ taught: surely HIS HAND [alone] is stated! Rather, said R. Abbahu, it means that he lowered his hand to within three handbreadths [of the ground] and accepted it.10 But HE STANDS is taught!11 — It refers to one who bends down. Alternatively, [he is standing] in a pit; another alternative: this refers to a dwarf. Raba demurred: Does the Tanna trouble to inform us of all these!12 Rather, said Raba, A man's hand is accounted to him as [an area) four by four. And thus too, when Rabin came,13 he said in R. Johanan's name: A man's hand is accounted to him as [an area] four by four.

 

R. Abin said in the name of R. Elai in R. Johanan's name: If one throws an article and it alights on his neighbour's hand, he is liable. What does he inform us? [that] a man's hand is accounted to him as [an area] four by four! But surely R. Johanan already stated it once? — You might argue. That is only when he himself accounts his hand such,14 but where he does not account his hand as such,15 I might say [that it is] not [so]. Therefore we are informed [otherwise].

 

R. Abin said in R. Elai's name in the name of R. Johanan: If he [the recipient stands still in his place and catches it, [the thrower] is liable; if he moves from his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is exempt. It was taught likewise: Others say: If he stands still in his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is liable; if he moves from his place and catches it, he [the thrower] is exempt.16 R. Johanan propounded: What if he throws an article and himself moves from his place, and catches it? What is his problem?17 — Said R. Ada b. Ahaba: His problem concerns two forces in the same man: are two forces in the same man accounted as the action of one man, hence he is liable, or perhaps they count as the action of two men?18 The question stands over.

 

R. Abin said in R. Johanan's name: If he puts his hand into his neighbour's courtyard and receives [some] rain, and then withdraws it, he is liable. R. Zera demurred: What does it matter whether his neighbour loads him19 or Heaven loads him; he himself did not effect removal? — Do not say, he [passively] receives rain, but, he catches it up.20 But removal must be from a place four [square], which is absent? — Said R. Hiyya son of R. Huna: E.g., he catches it up [as it rebounds] from the wall. But even on the wall, it does not rest there?21 — It is as Raba22 said [elsewhere], It refers to a sloping wall; so here too it refers to a sloping wall. Now, where was Raba's [dictum] said? — In connection with the following. For we learnt:

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(1) Of articles — i.e., it is accounted as though lacking air space entirely, and immediately an object enters therein, we regard it as lying on the ground.

(2) It is stated infra 49b and 96b that the definition of what constitutes forbidden work on the Sabbath is dependent on the work that was done in connection with the Tabernacle in the wilderness. Carrying was necessary, and so carrying an article four cubits is work. But there it was done under the open sky; hence Rab's dictum, and the same applies here. By ‘banners of the wilderness’ is meant the whole disposition and encampment of the Israelites, and they did not have any covered-in public ground.

(3) In Hor. 13b ‘others’ is identified with R. Meir.

(4) If A throws an article in the street to B, and B catches it while standing in his place, A is liable, because he is regarded as having both removed and deposited it. But if B moves away and catches it, A did not effect its deposit, since it does not lie where it would have done on account of his throw.

(5) Why then should he be liable in respect of carrying out?

(6) For it ranks as private ground, v. infra 101a.

(7) Then it ranks as private ground.

(8) Then it is public ground.

(9) Explanation of R. Abba.

(10) Everything within three handbreadths is regarded as the ground itself on the principle of labud (v. Glos), and thus the hand becomes a place four square.

(11) And he would have to be sitting for his hand to be so low.

(12) Surely he does not state a law which requires all these conditions. He should rather have taught: If the poor man spreads out his garment, etc.

(13) From Palestine to Babylon. Rabin and R. Dimi were two Palestinian amoraim who travelled between the Palestinian and the Babylonian academies to transmit the teachings of one to the other.

(14) If one intentionally deposits an article in his neighbour's hand, or takes an article into his own, in each case he accounts the hand as a resting place, i.e., an area four square.

(15) I.e., when it merely chances to alight on a man's hand.

(16) V. supra 5a notes.

(17) On what grounds should be he exempted: did he not remove it from one place and deposit it in another?

(18) The throw is one manifestation of his force: the catch arrests that force and is in the nature of a counter act; hence they may be regarded as performed by two people, which involves no liability.

(19) In which case the Mishnah declares him exempt.

(20) Actively. This is assumed to mean that he intercepts the flow of rain, beating it with one hand into the other.

(21) The side of a wall — it being assumed that an ordinary vertical one is meant — affords no resting place for the rain, whereas removal must be from a place where it can stay.

(22) Rashal reads: Rabbah.

 

Talmud - Mas. Sanhedrin 32a need 2 trials

 

C H A P T E R I V

 

MISHNAH. BOTH CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES DEMAND INQUIRY AND EXAMINATION.1 AS IT IS WRITTEN: YE SHALL HAVE ONE MANNER OF LAW.2 WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CAPITAL CASES? — CIVIL SUITS [ARE TRIED] BY THREE; CAPITAL CASES BY TWENTY-THREE3 CIVIL SUITS MAY BE OPENED EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE OPENED FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION.4 CIVIL SUITS MAY BE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE, EITHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; WHEREAS CAPITAL CHARGES ARE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OF ONE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT [AT LEAST] TWO FOR CONDEMNATION .5 IN MONETARY CASES THE DECISION MAY BE REVERSED6 BOTH FOR A ACQUITTAL AND FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES THE VERDICT MAY BE REVERSED FOR ACQUITTAL ONLY, BUT NOT FOR CONDEMNATION. IN MONETARY CASES, ALL7 MAY ARGUE FOR OR AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; WHILST IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ANYONE MAY ARGUE IN HIS FAVOUR, BUT NOT AGAINST HIM. IN CIVIL SUITS, HE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION, MAY8 THEN ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, AND VICE VERSA; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, ONE WHO HAS ARGUED FOR CONDEMNATION MAY SUBSEQUENTLY ARGUE FOR ACQUITTAL, BUT NOT VICE VERSA.9

 

CIVIL SUITS ARE TRIED BY DAY, AND CONCLUDED AT NIGHT.10 BUT CAPITAL CHARGES MUST BE TRIED BY DAY AND CONCLUDED BY DAY. CIVIL SUITS CAN BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY, WHETHER FOR ACQUITTAL OR CONDEMNATION; CAPITAL CHARGES MAY BE CONCLUDED ON THE SAME DAY WITH A FAVOURABLE VERDICT, BUT ONLY ON THE MORROW WITH AN UNFAVOURABLE VERDICT.11 THEREFORE TRIALS ARE NOT HELD ON THE EVE OF A SABBATH OR FESTIVAL.12 IN CIVIL SUITS.13 AND IN CASES OF CLEANNESS AND UNCLEANNESS, WE BEGIN WITH [THE OPINION OF] THE MOST EMINENT [OF THE JUDGES]; WHEREAS IN CAPITAL CHARGES, WE COMMENCE WITH [THE OPINION OF] THOSE ON THE SIDE [BENCHES].

 

ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CIVIL SUITS, BUT NOT ALL ARE ELIGIBLE TO TRY CAPITAL CHARGES, ONLY PRIESTS, LEVITES, AND ISRAELITES [LAYMEN] WITH WHOM PRIESTS CAN ENTER INTO MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP.14

 

GEMARA. Do civil suits really need inquiry and examination? The following opposes it: If a bond is dated the first of Nisan in the Shemittah,15 and witnesses came and said: ‘How can ye testify to this bond: were ye not with us on that day in such and such a place?’ the bond is valid, and its signatories remain competent [witnesses], for we presume that they might merely have postponed writing it.16 Now if you should think that inquiry and examination are necessary, how ‘presume that they might merely have postponed writing it?17 — But on your reasoning, one should object rather to the [following] Mishnah:18 Ante-dated bonds19 of indebtedness are invalid;20 if post-dated, they are valid.21 Now, if you should think that examination and inquiry are necessary, why are post-dated notes valid?22 — This23 is no difficulty, for a more powerful objection is raised,24 viz., that even in the case of a bond dated the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical year, when people, as a rule, do not transact loans, and when, consequently, we cannot [plausibly] say that the writing [of the bond] might have been postponed, since no one would intentionally weaken the validity of his document:25 yet since the annulment of debts is effectuated only at the expiration of the Sabbatical year,we declare the bond valid.26 At all events, however, the difficulty27 remains.

 

(Mnemonic: Harpash.28 )

 

R. Hanina said: By Biblical law, both monetary and capital cases require inquiry and investigation, as it is written: One manner of judgment ye shall have.29 Why then were civil suits exempted from this procedure? In order not to lock the door against borrowers.30 But if so,

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(1) Heb. vrhevu vahrs, i.e, examination of witnesses on the main points, e.g., amount (loaned), date and place.

(2) Lev. XXIV, 22. I.e., both capital and monetary cases shall be alike. With regard to capital cases it is written; Then shalt thou inquire and make search (Deut. XIII, 15).

(3) V. supra 2a; 23a.

(4) The reference is to the judicial debate on the matter. In civil suits, the points in favour of condemnation may be put first; but in capital charges, the arguments for acquittal must be first marshalled, but v. Krauss, a.l. for another interpretation. But of course, it cannot refer to the actual opening of the case; the indictment and case for the prosecution must obviously be stated before there is a charge to answer.

(5) V. supra 2a and infra 36b.

(6) On errors being revealed.

(7) Even the pupils, those seated behind the judges for the purpose of filling up vacancies. Cf. infra 37a.

(8) On finding his arguments erroneous.

(9) According to Rashi, this is deduced from Num. XXXV, 25, The Congregation shall deliver the manslayer, meaning that all the endeavours of the court should be directed towards deliverance. According to Maim., Yad, Sanh., X, 2, it is deduced from Ex. XXIII, 2, Neither shalt thou speak in a quarrel to incline etc. Probably he based his deduction on the Mekilta comment on the verse, where reference is made to the judges’ duty to lean towards acquittal.

(10) Where the deliberations have been protracted.

(11) In case points in the accused's favour are discovered during the night.

(12) Since should he be found guilty, the case cannot be concluded on the morrow, execution being forbidden on Sabbaths and Festivals. (From this it is seen that by ‘concluding’ the actual carrying out of the sentence is meant, not merely the promulgation of the verdict.) Moreover, it is against the law — except in the case of a rebellious Elder, v. infra 89a — to leave judgement in suspense. V. Maim., Yad, Sanh. XII, 4.

(13) CIVIL SUITS is omitted in most Mishnaic versions.

(14) I.e., of pure descent.

(15) vyhna; Sabbatical year. Though the regulations of the Sabbatical year include also the annulment of all monetary obligations, ‘when the creditor is legally debarred from collecting his debt (v. Deut. XV, 2), yet in various exceptional cases the law of Shemittah did not operate, e.g., if a Prosbul (kuczurp) had been written. This was a legal instrument executed and attested in Court whereby the lender retained the right to collect the debt at any time he thought fit (cf. Sheb. X, 4). Further shemittah does not affect a loan advanced on a pledge, or where the claim for collection had been made before the expiration of the Sabbatical year, in which cases loans are not annulled. V. ‘Ar. 28b.

(16) I.e., they might have witnessed the loan on an earlier date, but have postponed writing the bond until the first day of Nisan (Rashi). [According to Yad Ramah, render, ‘they might have post-dated it.’ We do not assume that it has been ante-dated (v. infra) as there is a presumption in favour of all duly attested documents, v. B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 748, n. 16.]

(17) If such an assumption is permissible, examination as to date and placed is purposeless.

(18) Rather than the Baraitha, since scholars are more conversant with the Mishnah than with Baraithoth.

(19) I.e., bearing on the evidence of witnesses, of an earlier date than the actual loan.

(20) As a rule the debtor's property is given as security for the loan, and in the case of default, the creditor may seize it if sold after the loan was incurred, but not before. Hence, if the note was ante-dated, sold property might be seized unlawfully. In order to prevent this, an ante-dated bond was declared altogether invalid, even from the date of transaction. Cf. B.M. 72a.

(21) It appears that the creditor must have renounced his security for the period between the date of the loan and that appearing on the note.

(22) Seeing that they might be mere forgeries? Hence, even if the loan itself is attested as having taken place, it should rank as only a verbal loan, which cannot be collected from property sold even after it was incurred.

(23) I.e., the fact that the objection is raised on the ground of a Baraitha rather than of a Mishnah.

(24) In the Baraitha quoted.

(25) By dating it some time in the Sabbatical year, when the debt is threatened with annulment, and so inevitably arousing the suspicion of forgery.

(26) By assuming its writing has been postponed to the Sabbatical year. Thus, this assumption, since it is possible, is made in spite of its improbability, a loan in the Sabbatical year still being rare. How much more so is the assumption to be made in normal cases. Why then should the witnesses be examined on the date, since even if it is disproved, their testimony holds good?

(27) I.e., the fact that the Baraitha is contradictory to our Mishnah; v. preceding note.

(28) V. p. 21, n. 5. Here it stands for R. Hanina, Raba, R. Papa, and R. ASHi. the four Rabbis whose views are given here.

(29) Lev. XXIV, 22.

(30) V. supra 2b. The view expressed in our Mishnah was taught before this enactment; and the Baraitha and Mishnah in Sheb., after this enactment.

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